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Employing Program Semantics
for Malware Detection
Smita Naval, Vijay Laxmi, Member, IEEE, Muttukrishnan Rajarajan, Senior Member, IEEE,
Manoj Singh Gaur, Member, IEEE, and Mauro Conti, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In recent years, malware has emerged as a critical
security threat. Additionally, malware authors continue to embed
numerous anti–detection features to evade existing malware de-
tection approaches. Against this advanced class of malicious pro-
grams, dynamic behavior–based malware detection approaches
outperform the traditional signature–based approaches by neu-
tralizing the effects of obfuscation and morphing techniques.
The majority of dynamic behavior detectors rely on system–calls
to model the infection and propagation dynamics of malware.
However, these approaches do not account an important anti–
detection feature of modern malware, i.e., system–call injection
attack. This attack allows the malicious binaries to inject irrele-
vant and independent system–calls during the program execution
thus modifying the execution sequences defeating the existing
system–call based detection. To address this problem, we propose
an evasion–proof solution that is not vulnerable to system–call
injection attacks. Our proposed approach precisely characterizes
the program semantics using Asymptotic Equipartition Prop-
erty (AEP) mainly applied in information theoretic domain. The
AEP allows us to extract the information–rich call sequences
that are further quantified to detect the malicious binaries.
Furthermore, the proposed detection model is less vulnerable to
call–injection attacks as the discriminating components are not
directly visible to malware authors. This particular characteristic
of proposed approach hampers a malware author’s aim of
defeating our approach. We run a thorough set of experiments
to evaluate our solution and compare it with existing system-
call based malware detection techniques. The results demonstrate
that the proposed solution is effective in identifying real malware
instances.
Index Terms—Malware, Malware Detection, System–calls,
Semantically–relevant paths, System–call injection attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
O
VER the last decade, malware has emerged as a crucial
security threat. The proliferation of advanced computing
and networking technology has empowered malware programs
with advanced anti-detection and anti-analysis features. The
advanced malware programs instigate a variety of attacks
such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, social
engineering attacks and clickfraud attacks, to name a few.
Malware is a persistent threat to any computer system’s
integrity, confidentiality, and availability [1]. These software
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programs have a disruptive impact on our applications, service
providers, storage, servers, and networks. In 2013, AV-test
institute discovered a total of 100 million new malicious files
and this number has reached 120 million in 2014 [2]. This
explosion of completely new malware threats and variants of
existing malicious threats cause substantial damage in terms
of financial losses. For instance, Stuxnet, Rocra, Code-Red,
and Slammer are few known malware threats that induced
significant financial losses costing billions of US dollars [3].
This trend is continuing and requires an assurance to mitigate
these malicious threats. Towards the security and privacy of
connected systems, malware detection becomes the first line
of defense.
A solution that can detect almost every malicious program
is practically impossible [4], and the evidence of this belief
can be seen by the detection efficiency of existing Anti-
Virus (AV) products [5]. These AV solutions mostly depend on
signature databases that need to be updated frequently. While
the process of malware creation has advanced, the malware
detection process still relies on signature-based approaches and
thus has been proved to be inefficient in capturing new and
advanced class of malware samples.
Existing arsenal of malware detection solutions relies on
static and dynamic techniques. The static techniques look for
syntactic markers or signatures to detect malware. Analyzing
a malware sample to identify the unique static markers re-
quires greater efforts as the effectiveness of these markers
is hampered by obfuscation and morphism (polymorphism
and metamorphism) techniques. As a consequence, the static
methods for malware detection may not capture unknown
malware instances [6]. To nullify the effects of obfuscation,
polymorphism and metamorphism on malware executables, re-
searchers have given preference to dynamic malware detection
approaches. In particular, the dynamic behavior-based malware
detection approaches utilize the semantic of a malware pro-
gram by examining its runtime interaction with system objects,
resources, and services [7]. Therefore, these approaches are
well suited for capturing new and syntactically different but
semantically similar unseen malware variants.
The majority of dynamic behavior-based malware detec-
tors [8]–[11] makes use of system-calls as these provide
an interface of application’s interaction with Operating Sys-
tem (OS). A system call is an interface between a user-level
application and kernel-level services. These services include
hardware, input-output related activities, creation/deletion of
processes and many more. To infect the host system, malware
needs to invoke a sequence of system-calls as these are nonby-
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passable. Therefore, capturing malware by employing system-
calls will allow devising a reliable detection solution. However,
the present malware programs are equipped with advanced
anti-detection techniques which can evade even system-call
based malware detectors [12].
To counter system-call based approaches, malware authors
make use of shadow attacks [13] and system-call injection
attacks [14]. The feasibility of former attacks was first
demonstrated by authors in [13]. The authors in their paper
have shown that the critical system-call sequences of malware
can be divided and exported into separate shadow processes.
The shadow processes individually act in benign manner and
collectively these depict malicious behavior. These shadow
processes communicate with rewritten malicious code to
deliver their malicious payload. The system-call injection
attacks are deployed by inserting irrelevant and independent
calls in the actual execution flow of malware binaries. By
doing so, detection approaches based on graph matching or
path similarity analysis are defeated. These attacks are the
variant of code-injection attacks [14], [15]. The shadow
attacks suffer from the following limitations that restrict its
applicability in practice.
1) The shadow attacks lead to multi-process malware that
is slower than the original single process malware. Such
a malware, cannot be used in various real-time attack
situations (such as chain attacks) [16].
2) The implementation of these attacks requires the division
of malware; the communication of multiple processes;
the bootstrap, and the execution sequence of multiple
processes. Failure of any shadow process will result into
the failure of entire process [17].
The aforementioned challenges limit the feasibility of the
shadow attacks. On the other hand, the system-call injection
attacks are free of these limitations, and, therefore, to earn
more revenue, malware authors would prefer these attacks.
Taking this fact into consideration, we present an effective
system-call based malware detection approach that is resistant
against system-call injection attacks.
In this paper, we devise a novel malware detection mecha-
nism, which is resilient against system-call injection attacks.
The proposed detector characterizes the program behavior by
exploiting the system-level information flow. The character-
ized behavior is represented in terms of semantically-relevant
paths employed to build and train the feature space. For ex-
tracting and identifying semantically-relevant paths, we adopt
the concept of Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP [18])
from information theory. According to AEP, in any graph,
there exists a few paths that carry almost all information of
the graph. Following this concept and the proofs given in [19],
we apply AEP in our approach to extract semantically-relevant
paths, which depict the program behavior. We construct a set of
such semantically-relevant paths on which we apply a measure
called Average Logarithmic Branching Factor (ALBF) [19]
to build our feature space. Finally, our model is trained
to differentiate between benign and malware programs. The
contributions of this paper are summarized below:
• We propose a novel malware detection approach
that characterizes the program behavior in terms of
semantically-relevant paths. In our approach, these paths
are extracted by exploiting system-level information flow.
• We form a novel feature space constructed by quantify-
ing the semantically-relevant paths using ALBF metric.
Unlike other approaches [20]–[22], our feature space
consists of non-string features, and, therefore, it makes
our method an evasion-proof solution to malware authors.
• We show that our approach is resilient against system-call
injection attacks. The performance of our model remains
consistent even after injecting thousands of independent
system-calls into malware traces.
• We have tested the detection capability of our model
with real benign and malware instances. We observe
the detection accuracy of ∼95% which demonstrates the
effectiveness of our model in identifying real malicious
attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II states our problem. The proposed method is illustrated
in Sections III and IV. The experimental setup that includes
dataset collection and results is discussed in Section V. In Sec-
tion VI, we discuss the merits and demerits of our approach.
Section VII highlights the existing work in the domain of
malware detection. Finally, the concluding remarks are given
in Section VIII.
II. THE PROBLEM
To evade detection, malware is continuously being evolved
and equipped with anti-detection techniques such as code
obfuscation, polymorphism, metamorphism, anti-debugging,
anti-VM, code-injection, to name a few. By incorporating these
techniques into malicious code, malware authors try to extend
the lifetime of malicious code and hide its actual malicious
intent. The anti-detection techniques have instigated a never-
ending arms-race between malware detectors and malware au-
thors. In this paper, we propose a novel detection technique for
identifying detection-aware malicious threats. Our proposed
approach investigates the program semantics to identify the
information-rich components of malware and benign files.
A. Technical Viewpoint
The Complexity of sophisticated malware codes makes them
difficult to detect and analyze. These programs can be found in
multiple statically diverse forms having the same functionality.
Therefore, to understand the behavior of a malware program
we have to dive into its semantics instead of the syntax.
The semantic (behavior) of any program can be explored by
exploiting its execution-flow. During execution, the malicious
programs try to infect host machine with actual malicious
payload (if it is not environment-aware [23]–[25] or having
trigger-based behavior [26]). Our prime objective is to define
a metric that can quantify the program semantics. For this,
we consider AEP that is based on Shannon’s entropy [27].
The Shannon’s entropy describes the amount of meaningful
information present in a program object [19] as it remains
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unchanged when one-to-one function is applied [18]. Using
entropy, we extract semantically-relevant call sequences and
quantify them to construct feature space of the proposed detec-
tion model. Our notion of characterizing program semantics is
not vulnerable to call-injection attack or behavior obfuscation
as the discriminating components are composed of: 1) multiple
call sequences, and 2) non-string based features.
The behavior components of malware often exhibit similar
behavior with the different set of call sequences incurred
due to the injection attacks. For example, self-replication
behavior of malware in which it copies its content to
either a new file or into an already existing file, can be
represented in one of the following system-call based path se-
quences: 1) NtCreateFile→NtOpenFile→NtReadFi-
le→NtWriteFile, 2) NtOpenFile→NtCreateFile→
NtReadFile→NtWriteFile, and 3) NtCreateSecti-
on→NtMapViewOfSection→NtCreateFile→NtSe-
tInformationFile→NtWriteFile. To capture these
paths showing similar behavior, we represent the program
behavior through multiple paths carrying almost the same
information quotient. These behavior components are further
transformed into a non-string based feature space to avoid
string-based evasions [1]. The problem statement is composed
of sub-problems listed as follows:
1) Encapsulating program behavior into semantically-
relevant paths through AEP concept and extract them
via ALBF.
2) Verify and validate the specified behavior by construct-
ing a learning-based detection model.
The proposed approach enables us to transform the input
binary programs into two forms; one that characterizes the
most relevant information; andthe other that exploits this
relevant information to construct a detection model and thus
verifies effectiveness of extracted behavior.
III. ENCAPSULATING PROGRAM BEHAVIOR
In this phase, execution traces of binaries are transformed
into Ordered System-Call Graph (OSCG) derived from the
sequence of invoked system-calls. A vertex of OSCG corre-
sponds to a system-call in program trace. An edge from vertex
u to vertex v of OSCG corresponds to the occurrence of the
pair 〈Su,Sv〉 in the sequence. Here, Su and Sv are system-
calls corresponding to vertices u and v respectively. The graph
preserves order. So, a pair 〈S1,S2〉 shall add an edge from
vertex 1 to 2, whereas 〈S2,S1〉 shall add an edge from vertex
2 to 1. An OSCG is constructed for each input binary. In order
to specify program behavior, the OSCGs are used to determine
all reachable paths from initial node (the first call invoked) to
the final node (last call invoked) of the sample. We apply AEP
on each path to check if it is semantically-relevant path. The
detailed description is given in subsequent paragraphs.
A. Transforming Program Binaries as OSCG
To transform binaries into ordered system-call
graph (OSCG), each binary is executed in a virtualized
environment. In particular, we have employed Ether [28].
Execution of binaries is monitored and invoked system-calls
are logged. We prefer Ether to other analysis frameworks
as it provides host-based tracing by employing hardware
virtualization. It is resilient to anti-debugging, anti-emulation
and code-obfuscation and in-guest changes are also made
hidden [29]. Ether produces a page fault or exception to
intercept the system-calls made by the target application.
Whenever this application requires a system service, it
executes SYSENTER that transfers the control to kernel space
where it copies the value (address) stored in a special register
SYSENTER_EIP_MSR into instruction pointer (IP). Ether
sets SYSENTER_EIP_MSR to a default value. Accessing this
value causes a page fault and in this way Ether knows that
a system-call has been made. The SYSENTER_EIP_MSR is
changed back to its original value, and the target application
continues its execution. Ether mediates all access to the
SYSENTER_EIP_MSR register and can, therefore, hide any
modifications of the register from the analysis target.
The acquired traces are used in extracting the se-
quence of invoked system-calls. Consider an execution
trace ξ = S1,S2,S3,S1,S2,S2,S3,S3,S2. This trace has three
distinct system-calls S1,S2 and S3. So, we construct
OSCG with three nodes. As the sequence has pairs
〈S1,S2〉,〈S2,S3〉,〈S3,S1〉 and 〈S3,S2〉, edges are added from
node 1 to 2, node 2 to 3, node 3 to 1, and node 3 to 2.
Graph-based representation such as OSCG, also, captures the
sequential nature of the data [30]. Representing execution
traces in the form of directed labeled graph is not new. In the
past, many approaches have used graph-based representations
to detect malicious files [8], [9], [11], [31]. In OSCG, we
ignore all the system-call parameters to avoid the sensitivity
towards handles, arguments and other system artifacts.
We shall be using ξ to represent execution trace of a sample
and S to represent the set of all possible (distinct) system-
calls. In our case |S| = 284, i.e., S = {S1,S2, · · · ,S284} as
only 284 possible system-calls can be invoked on Windows
XP (SP2) [32]. Each call in S performs a service at the kernel
level that is requested by running binary. For instance, routine
NtMapViewOfSection is only invoked to map the view
of a section into the virtual address space of running process,
NtWriteFile is called to write into a file and NtClose
is the routine invoked to close the handles created by other
routines. Successive calls to these routines collectively de-
pict program behavior. To characterize the program behavior
through OSCG, we preserve the order in which system-calls
are invoked.
Definition 1 An Ordered System-Call Graph (OSCG) G =
(S,E) is a directed graph, where S is the set of vertices and
each vertex represents a system-call. E = {Ei j|Si
ρi j
→ S j; Si,S j ∈
S}, where ρi j denotes the transition probability from system-
call Si to system-call S j.
It is assumed that paths in graph G are Markov chains, i.e., the
future state depends on the present state only and not on past
states. The transition probability ρi j is computed as follows.
ρi j =
count(Si → S j)
∑284k=1 count(Si → Sk)
(1)
where, Si → S j represents a transition from Si to S j. As
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discussed earlier, the paths of graph G are Markov chains.
Therefore, the computed transition probability must satisfy
Markov property [33] as given in Equation 2.
284
∑
i=1, j=1
ρi j =
{
0 if all entries in ith row are zero
1 otherwise
}
(2)
For example, consider the execution trace
ξ = {S1,S2,S3,S1,S4,S6,S2,S2,S3,S6} of a program P .
For S = {S1,S2, · · · ,S5,S6}, Figure 1 shows the corresponding
graph G and matrix for this example. Here, the set of distinct
system-calls invoked by the program P is (S1,S2,S3,S4,S6).
The system-call S5 is an isolated node as it is not invoked
during execution of P . Edges are directed and labeled
with transition probability ρi j. For instance, in the execution
trace ξ , two transitions S3 → S1 and S3 → S6 occurred
from node S3, therefore, both the edges are labeled with
equal probability, i.e., 0.5. The matrix representation of P
shows a 6 × 6 square matrix called transition probability
matrix (TPM). Every row in TPM adds either to 1 or to 0.
TPM in our case is 284× 284 as |S| for Windows XP (SP2)
is 284.
Fig. 1: An Example of Ordered System-Call Graph (OSCG) and
Transition Probability Matrix (TPM).
B. Specifying Program Behavior
The proposed approach is based on semantically-relevant
paths. This concept is inherited from information theoretic
model and first introduced by Cui et al. [19] in the domain
of software testing. According to AEP, “for a random process
there exists few paths that carry much more information than
the other paths of the graph” [18]. The authors have proved
this concept and named these paths as ‘typical paths’. In
literature, AEP has been applied successfully to the identically
independent distributed processes and Markov chains [18]. In
this paper, we also follow the same concept and hypothesize
that there exist paths that are more probable than the other
paths of OSCG. A path P of a graph G is defined as follows.
Definition 2 A path P = {S1,S2, · · ·Sn} is an alternate se-
quence of nodes and edges of G which starts from S1 and
ends at Sn.
Here, S1 denotes Sstart and Sn represents Send . Sstart is the first
system-call invoked and Send is the last system-call invoked
during execution of a program P . Each link in a path is
expressed by its transition from one system-call to the other.
For any path between two nodes of OSCG, path probability
is computed from transition probability of its constituent
links. The path probability Pr(P) of a path P is given by
Pr(P) = Pr(S1).Pr(Sn = Sn|Sn−1 = Sn−1, · · · ,S1 = S1) =
Pr(S1) · · ·Pr(Sn = Sn|Sn−1 = Sn−1). The Pr(S1) is the initial
probability of node S1. The initial probability of a node Si is
the probability of occurrence of Si among all the system-calls
invoked in the execution trace ξ . Paths containing links with
high transition probability are likely to contribute more to the
semantic quotient.
We aimed to compute all the paths originating from Sstart
to Send nodes of formed OSCG for extracting semantically-
relevant paths of a program P . Computing all-paths between
two nodes is an NP-complete problem [34]. To resolve this, we
approximate this phase by extracting candidate paths instead
of all paths. In order to determine if a path is semantically-
relevant, we apply AEP on each candidate path P of the
sample. For this, we first determine the maximal entropy rate
λ ∗ of the binary program under consideration as follows [19].
λ ∗ = max
{
lim
n→∞
log(Tn)
n
}
, (3)
Here, Tn is the total number of paths of length n in G.
Using λ ∗, we extract the semantically-relevant paths that carry
nontrivial amount of information. Now, in order to define ε-
semantically-relevant path with ε > 0, we apply following two
properties (Equation 4 and Equation 5) on each path P:
∣∣∣ 1n log 1Pr(S1,S2,··· ,Sn) −λ ∗
∣∣∣< ε, (4)
logB(S1,S2, · · · ,Sn)
n− 1
>
1
2
(λ ∗− ε), (5)
Where B(S1,S2, · · · ,Sn) = ∏1≤i≤n b(Si) and b(Si) is the
branching factor of the node Si. The left hand side (LHS)
of Equation (5) is average logarithmic branching factor used
for constructing our feature space. We select ALBF metric of
each path to construct our feature space as branching factor
is a good indicator of semantic relatedness [35]. Now, we can
define ε-semantically-relevant paths as follows: (Definition 3).
Definition 3 A path P = {S1,S2, · · · ,Sn} is ε-semantically-
relevant if it satisfies Property 1 and Property 2 (Equa-
tions 4 and 5).
We use T(ε) to denote ε-relevant set, a set of all ε-seman-
tically-relevant paths of the program P. The paths in T(ε)
vary according to the value of ε . If ε1 < ε2 · · ·< εk, T(ε1)⊆
T(ε2) · · · ⊆ T(εk). A very small value of ε may not capture
all paths needed to encapsulate information content whereas a
high value of ε may include irrelevant/redundant path lowering
the information content of T. We have kept the value of ε
ranging from 0.5 to 7.5. The upper limit of ε is the maximum
value (7.59) of Property 1 (LHS) in all paths of malware
datasets. The initial value of ε is considered 0.5 that is greater
than 0. With respect to each value of ε , we train our model
with the features relevant for specifying malicious behavior.
The authors in [19], have proved two theorems , which
ensure that typical (semantically-relevant) paths carry relevant
information of the graph. The theorems are stated as follows:
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Theorem 1: Let ε > 0. The ε-typical paths take probability
1, asymptotically; i.e.,
limsup
n→∞
Pr(
∣∣∣ 1n log 1Pr(S1,S2,··· ,Sn) −λ ∗
∣∣∣< ε) = 1.
Theorem 2: Let ε > 0. For any path P of G achieves λ ∗,
limsup
n→∞
Pr(
logB(S1,S2, · · · ,Sn)
n− 1
>
1
2
(λ ∗− ε)) = 1.
Theorems 1 and 2 have been proved by employing limsup
definition of entropy rate instead of limit definition. Prov-
ing AEP with the limit definition, as in Shannon-Mcmillan-
Breiman theorem [18], is difficult as it requires a strong side
condition (ergodicity). In the present context, malware does
not constitute same behavior averaged over time and does
not exhibit ergodicity. Therefore, we can also consider the
limsup definition of typical paths. Assuming the theorems
and proofs are valid, we apply their concept of typical paths
towards semantically-relevant paths in our approach. The set of
semantically-relevant paths is not unique as a given program
may have multiple execution traces due to the presence of
conditional constructs (triggering of different constructs can
invoke different executions). Any execution trace that results
in invocation of malicious activity should suffice to extract
semantically-relevant paths capturing malicious behavior. We
have constructed OSCG from the single execution trace as
exploring more execution traces shall add to monitoring over-
head.
1) Semantically-relevant Path Extraction: Consider the
Transition Probability Matrix (TPM) and graph G as shown
in Figure 2. Here, we have a total of five nodes in the graph
and the matrix that show the transition from one node to the
other. In the example, Sstart is the node 1 and Send is the
node 5. All possible cycle-free paths from node 1 to 5 are
determined. We get a total of 9 paths. Then, we determine
the value of λ ∗ considering all possible path lengths of 2,3
and 4. Table I shows the values as computed by application
of Equation (4). These values range from 1.85 to 2.765 so we
can select the values for ε in the specified range. With ε = 2.1,
we get the paths P7 and P8 and for ε=2.6, we have P2, P3,
P6, P7, and P8 as candidates for semantically-relevant paths.
Selecting the different values of ε and applying Equation (5)
will give us different sets of semantically-relevant paths. With
these different sets of paths, we train our model and observe
detection accuracy.
Fig. 2: Ordered System-Call Graph (OSCG) and Transition Proba-
bility Matrix (TPM).
TABLE I: Paths from node 1 to 5 showing values w.r.t. Equation (4).
Paths Probability of Values of
the paths Property 1
P1: 1–2–5 Pr(P1) : 0.0108 2.765
P2: 1–2–3–5 Pr(P2) : 0.0032 2.100
P3: 1–2–4–5 Pr(P3) : 0.0013 2.530
P4: 1–2–4–3–5 Pr(P4) : 0.0002 2.675
P5: 1–4–2–3–5 Pr(P5) : 0.0016 2.925
P6: 1–4–3–5 Pr(P6) : 0.0021 2.330
P7: 1–4–2–5 Pr(P7) : 0.0054 1.850
P8: 1–4–3–2–5 Pr(P8) : 0.0010 2.095
P9: 1–4–5 Pr(P9) : 0.0108 2.765
IV. VERIFYING AND LEARNING MALWARE DETECTION
This section presents our learning-based model that dis-
criminates benign and malware programs. We aim to exploit
semantically-relevant behavior of these programs using ma-
chine learning techniques and propose a model capable of
identifying the suspicious behavior of malware binaries. The
obtained high detection accuracy confirms the efficiency of
the characterized behavior. In addition to that, we also show
that the proposed model is evasion-resistant against system-
call injection attacks.
For our proposed learning-based detection model, we con-
struct feature space F by utilizing extracted semantically-
relevant paths. We have used ‘histogram binning’ tech-
nique [36] (mainly applied in the fields of information re-
trieval, image processing and text processing) as it incorporates
approximate matching and reduces sensitivity to slight changes
in system-call sequences. This avoids the possibility of evasion
encountered due to detection-aware malware. ALBF metric has
been employed to determine the bin to which a semantically
relevant path belongs to. In our case, each bin corresponds to a
range of ALBF values. These bins are spaced at uniform inter-
vals and hold the frequency count of respective semantically-
relevant paths. These bins are considered as features. For
example, if feature space consists of three bins b1,b2,b3 and
for program P1, respective bin frequency counts are f1, f2, f3,
its feature vector shall be 〈 f1, f2, f3〉.
Selecting appropriate number of bins for building our
feature space involves a tradeoff between less detailed fea-
tures (small number of bins imply coarser granularity and loss
of information) and overly detailed features (too many bins
result in loss of generalization and flexibility). We determine
maximum ALBF value corresponding to malicious binaries.
Dividing this by bin size yields number of bins. We con-
structed and evaluated feature space with bins sizes of 1, 5, 10
and 15 and observe the detection accuracy. The initial results
indicate that the bins formed with a range interval of 5 (bin size
is five) identify benign and malware samples more accurately.
The feature vector containing bins with higher intervals merges
the relevant paths of different ALBF values and may result
in information loss. This merging also reduces number of
elements in a feature vector. Therefore, we set the interval
of 5 and consider 310 non-overlapping bins as features into
our feature vector.
The constructed Feature Vector Table (FVT) is trained
using learning algorithms. We use an ensemble-based learning
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algorithm i.e., Random Forest, [37], [38] for differentiating
malware and benign samples. Since, it provides a better
generalization of information even in the presence of noise
and therefore widely used in the literature. It is a collection
of many decision trees. It is primarily used when the data set
is very large. The decision tree is constructed by randomly
selecting subsets of the training data and attributes that can
partition the available data set. The final decision tree is an
ensemble (i.e., a collection) of forest such that each decision
tree contributes towards the classification of instances.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
The experiments are performed on Intel Core i3 2.40 GHz
with 2.8 GiB RAM, running on Ubuntu 12.04 operating
system. For capturing the system-call traces we use Xen
hypervisor [39] and create a virtual environment using Ether.
The underlying guest OS in Ether is Windows XP (SP2).
Therefore, we have built our prototype model by executing
binaries in Windows XP. Although, Microsoft abandoned its
support for XP but still it is a popular OS widely used in
various government agencies, banks and in ATMs. As a result,
existing recent similar approaches [6], [11], [14], [40] also
utilize XP. However, the proposed approach is not specific
to particular OS and analysis framework as: 1) the target
malicious binaries (PE format) affect all Windows platforms,
and 2) system-call sequence used in Windows XP is a subset
of those utilized in Windows 7 [32]. It will perform in a
similar fashion if system-call traces are collected with different
Windows OS and some other analysis framework (Anubis,
Cuckoo, GFISandbox, to name a few). In this section, we
present the implementation details and evaluation of our pro-
posed approach. The experiments are carried out using benign
and malware executable samples. The proposed approach
detects the malicious Windows PE binaries (PE is the most
popular file format among malware authors as reported by the
virustotal.com [41]).
A. Experimental Dataset
We utilize real instances of malware and benign samples.
The majority of malware detection approaches [40], [42] make
use of one malware dataset to evaluate the performance of their
approach. These approaches perform well on selected dataset,
however, do not generalize well to other datasets and result in
performance degradation. Therefore to evaluate generalization
of our approach, we used two different malware datasets and
label them as Dold (old dataset) and Dnew (new dataset) .
The former dataset consists of 1209 samples. This set also
includes samples utilized in [43] for their work of detecting
metamorphic malware. The types of samples in this set include
packed, polymorphic and metamorphic malware. We selected
this dataset for two reasons: 1) to represent the class of
malware samples discovered prior to 2012, and 2) to estimate
the performance of our method with morphed and packed
samples. The latter set (Dnew) of samples is downloaded
from the malware repository system, i.e., VirusShare.com. The
mentioned repository system labels each uploaded sample after
scanning it with 55 AV scanners. We can rely on the labeling
process of VirusShare.com as it is akin to comparing with
large number of AV scanners. This dataset consists of 1226
malware samples each of which was discovered from January
2013 to March 2014 and it is labeled as ‘new’. Both datasets
are divided into training (70%) and test (30%) set.
We used one benign dataset that contained total number
of 1316 samples. Benign samples are scanned by uploading
them to the web portal VirusTotal.com to verify their non-
maliciousness. Our benign dataset consists of different kinds
of software applications such as browsers, games, filezilla,
googletalk setup, iTunes, youtubedownloader, Media players,
wireshark, to name a few. We used these benign software
programs to evaluate the accuracy of proposed model.
As discussed earlier, we monitored the execution of each
benign and malware sample in the controlled environment
created using Ether. We observed that during execution there
were some malware samples that did not generate any log
and few benign and malware samples that cause executional
errors. The malware samples embedded with anti-detection
features (VM-aware and trigger-based) do not generate any
log. The execution errors occurred due to OS compatibility
issues. Our final datasets (benign and malware) include the
samples that are executed in guest OS without abnormal
termination, without execution errors and without generating
any logs.
To generate system-call logs, each sample is permitted to
execute for 10 minutes. According to [44], five minutes is
sufficient duration for the execution monitoring. We doubled
this execution time to capture the malware equipped with
capability of carrying out time-out attacks. We observed that
in all samples, benign as well as malicious, the execution
sequences are mostly made of 160 different calls out of 284
calls. We refer these calls as ‘frequent’ calls. Remaining 124
calls are regarded to as ‘rare’ in following discussions. The
experiments are performed with training sets of benign and
malware datasets, and the performance evaluation is carried
out using test samples.
B. Approximate All Path Computation
We constructed OSCG for each sample as discussed earlier
to determine the paths between Sstart and Send . Identifying
all paths between two nodes of a graph is an NP-complete
problem [34]. The time complexity of computing all paths is
exponential in case of a complete graph. To reduce the time
complexity, we approximate the ‘all path computation phase’
of our approach. We, first investigate if an OSCG is sparse.
We observe the average link-count in OSCGs of benign and
malware samples of our datasets. The average link-count of
benign samples is 174 and that of malware samples is 282
indicative of the sparse nature of our OSCGs as the number
of edges is in O(|S|), where S is the number of vertices (284)
in the graph.
To approximate the all-paths phase, we conducted an exper-
iment with 500 malware and 500 benign samples. The samples
are selected in a manner that they cover the entire range of
link-counts. With these samples, we exhaustively computed all
paths from Sstart and Send and computed average number of
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paths for a given path-length. Figure 3 shows this distribution
for both benign and malware samples. As can be seen here,
average number of paths is normally distributed for benign as
well as malicious files. However, in path-length ranging from
10 to 31, the average number of paths in malware samples
is more than the benign samples. Paths in this range can
be used for discriminating a malware from benign. We have
used the paths in this particular range as candidate paths for
extracting semantically-relevant paths. Instead of computing
all paths for all the samples we computed the candidate
paths (approximation of all paths), which reduces the path
computation time for all the samples.
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Fig. 3: Path distribution w.r.t. lengths in benign and malware datasets.
Table II shows the average time consumed in determining
all paths and candidate paths. We observe that time taken
in computing all paths is higher than the candidate paths. It
means that using candidate path we can reduce the overall
computation time. The maximum time consumed was ∼ 11
hours and ∼ 9.7 hours for all-path computation and candidate-
path computation respectively. We also observe that there
are some samples, which required higher processing time
than the samples having higher link-count. This indicates that
processing time is not directly proportional to link-count. The
processing time for this particular phase needs to improve for
practical application. In the majority of samples (∼ 88.3%),
candidate paths have a link-count of atmost 450 which result
into a total time of ∼ 1.83 hours.
TABLE II: Processing time of all-paths and candidate-paths.
Link-count Avg. Time of Avg. Time of % of Samples
up to All-paths candidate-paths Covered
(in sec.) (in sec.)
50 0.01 0.005 0.98
51-150 1.78 0.47 6.07
151-250 450.64 162.89 37.89
251-350 9271.65 1145.72 27.32
351-450 19080.20 5292.86 16.08
451-550 24848.32 15565.60 9.84
551-650 33482.56 28384.77 1.33
651-750 39524.45 35109.9 0.49
We determined the candidate-paths for all the samples and,
then, extracted the semantically-relevant paths as explained in
Section III. We constructed T(ε), ε-relevant set of benign and
malware samples and feature vectors for all binaries using
the frequency distribution of ALBF values of their T(ε). The
constructed feature vector is trained using Random Forest as
described earlier. The above process has been repeated for
different ε values.
C. Detection Accuracy
We have evaluate the performance of our proposal in
terms of popular evaluation metrics [45], [46] – i.e, True
Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), True Negative
Rate (TNR) and False Negative Rate (FNR). In the present
context, we designate malware class as positive and benign
class as negative. TPR (FPR) is the fraction of malware
instances correctly (incorrectly) classified. Similarly, TNR
(FNR) denotes the fraction of benign instances correctly
(incorrectly) classified. For any malware detection model, it is
desired that TPR should be high and FPR and FNR should be
low. For two datasets Dold , Dnew considered in our evaluation,
Table III summarizes TPR and TNR for different values of ε .
TABLE III: Detection accuracy of Dold and Dnew.
Dold Dnew Overall
ε TPR TNR TPR TNR Acc
0.5 0.3 100.0 1.7 100.0 50.50
1.0 4.5 32.7 18.1 99.2 38.62
1.5 64.0 71.3 44.6 62.7 60.65
2.0 81.8 88.4 77.9 78.1 81.55
2.3 92.3 91.5 88.4 93.3 91.37
2.6 96.2 95.3 94.6 93.8 94.97
2.9 95.9 96.1 94.3 95.4 95.42
3.2 90.3 94.3 94.7 96.1 93.85
3.5 91.4 95.1 92.3 93.9 93.17
4.0 88.6 92.6 89.1 91.5 90.45
4.5 87.9 88.9 90.3 89.0 89.02
5.5 87.1 89.2 89.3 89.6 88.80
6.5 84.1 88.6 87.1 90.3 87.52
7.5 84.6 87.1 85.0 87.2 85.97
As can be seen from Table III, ε ∈ {2.3,2.6,2.9,3.2}
yields higher detection accuracy. It can be easily deduced
from the table statistics that our constructed feature space
has the ability to discriminate between malware and benign
samples. Our model achieves the highest accuracy of 95.425%
at ε = 2.9. Therefore, we have selected it as a threshold. We
conducted this experiment extensively with various values of ε
to validate our hypothesis that lower values of ε excludes some
of information-rich paths. This is reflected in poor performance
exhibited by initial rows of Table III. Too many paths, as
happens at higher values of ε , can lead to generalization and,
therefore, result into the decrease in detection accuracy.
The misclassified instances are shown in Table IV. As can
be seen, our model performs best at selected threshold of
ε=2.9. For malware classification, FPR and FNR should be
low as a high value of FPR shall result in malware being
considered benign. A high FNR may prohibit execution of
legitimate applications. With Dold samples, we achieved 3.9%
and 4.6% of FPR and FNR respectively. Similarly, FPR of
4.1% and FNR of 5.7% is obtained with Dnew.
Some of the malware samples yield only partial logs,
and this has contributed towards FPR. During runtime, these
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samples terminated very quickly and did not reveal their actual
payload. In our case, this behavior was observed with samples
belonging to worm.autorun malware family. The samples
of this family try to infect the system by creating .inf file on
root directory of system. When these files detect the presence
of virtual environment, they do not reveal their malicious
payload and terminate the execution. Hence, these instances
were misclassified. A false negative is observed when a
legitimate monitored application shows high similarity with
the malicious samples. We found that the system-calls related
to memory access, process and thread handling activities were
common to malware samples. Any benign application using
these calls may show high correlation with malware samples
and may be misclassified. This aids to FNR.
TABLE IV: False rate with Dold and Dnew.
Dold Dnew
ε FNR FPR FNR FPR
0.5 99.7 0 98.3 0
1 95.5 67.3 81.9 0.8
1.5 36 28.7 55.4 37.3
2.0 18.2 11.6 22.1 21.9
2.3 7.7 8.5 11.6 6.7
2.6 3.8 4.7 5.4 6.2
2.9 4.1 3.9 5.7 4.6
3.2 9.7 5.7 5.3 3.9
3.5 8.6 4.9 7.7 6.1
4 11.4 7.4 10.9 8.5
4.5 12.1 11.1 9.7 11
5.5 12.9 10.8 10.7 10.4
6.5 15.9 11.4 12.9 9.7
7.5 15.4 12.9 15 12.8
To reduce the false alarm rate in our approach, we need
to identify and remove the call-transitions that are common
to OSCGs of most of the malware and benign samples. For
this, we may first extract the common subgraph (using graph
isomorphism [47]) from all malware and benign samples and
then the edges of this subgraph can be removed from all
the OSCGs. However, the false alarm rate in our approach
is considerably low when compared to approaches [6], [40],
and [20] in which the false alarm rate of 10.9%, 9.8% and
9.7% is observed respectively.
The detection capability of our approach with unknown
samples (test samples that are not used in training phase) is
evaluated using two test datasets with both the training models
prepared with ε value as 2.9. We performed testing of our
both the test sets. For the first test set, we observed overall
detection accuracy of 94.2% (Dold: 94.8%, Dnew: 94.7%). In
case of second test set, we achieved an overall accuracy of
93.4% (Dold: 93.7%, Dnew: 93.1%). The detection accuracy
of test samples is approximately similar to that of our trained
model. There is a minor difference in detection accuracy of
both the sets and this was expected because the learning-
based models always perform better with training samples
due to the implicit knowledge about the samples. Similar
trends of false detection rate are observed with test samples.
Our experimental results indicate that the proposed method is
effective in discriminating the benign and malware instances.
D. Resilient against dynamic obfuscation
As discussed earlier, modern malware inserts irrelevant and
independent system-calls to evade the system-call based
detection approaches that rely on either signature or exact
pattern matching. These solutions are evaded by malware
authors as these methods directly work on raw system-features
such as opcodes, instructions, hexbytes, and etc. that can
be obfuscated or replaced by equivalent alternate features.
The discriminating components are clearly visible and hence
tampered by malware writers. On the other hand, our method
provides a solution by employing a feature space that is not
linearly related to raw system features and hence opaque to
malware writers.
To measure the robustness of proposed approach in the
presence of system-call injection attack, we performed experi-
ments on two sets of system-calls, i.e., rarely invoked system-
calls (RISC) and frequently invoked system-calls (FISC). The
former set consists of calls that are rarely invoked by malware
or benign applications in our datasets. As stated earlier, the
malware and benign applications mostly utilize 160 calls
out of 284. Therefore, remaining calls serve as irrelevant to
both the applications and therefore become valid candidates
of injection attacks. The latter set includes frequent calls
invoked by benign and malware applications. For this, we have
selected the benign sample from the set containing 100 benign
programs, which are considered on the basis of larger trace
size among all the other benign samples. We also evaluated
the impact of considering single or different benign programs
on our approach. For single program we selected the sample
AdbRdr930_en_US.exe containing more than 105 calls.
We observed that in both cases the results are nearly the
same. It indicates that considering different benign programs
for injection does not affect our approach.
In both the experiments, we inserted system-calls into
random locations of the execution trace of randomly selected
malware programs. The malware samples considered for this
are the test samples of Dnew dataset as these samples belong
to the class of latest malware attacks. The number of calls
in these malware traces ranges from 674 to 124652. We
inserted total calls that are 10%, 20%, · · · , 100%, 150%, 200%
of malware traces. For inserting system-calls, we adopt the
strategy followed by authors in [11]. These calls are injected
one at a time and at random positions in the malware traces.
For both the experiments, we observed the performance of our
model with ε value of 2.9 and results are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 illustrates the performance of our model with both
the experiments in terms of detection accuracy. The detection
accuracy of our model does not vary up to 30% of call-
injection rate. For some malware samples, this translates to
injection of ∼30000 calls. We exhaustively injected calls into
malware traces and in this way injection also occur in extracted
semantically-relevant paths and therefore beyond 30% call
injection rate we observed the fall in detection accuracy.
Figure 5 shows TPR and FPR values with respect to both
the experiments. It means that the discriminating patterns
of proposed approach are not affected by the injected calls.
However, when we increase the injection rate, the detection
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Fig. 4: Detection capability in presence of behavior obfuscation with
RISC and FISC.
accuracy starts decreasing. This fall in the detection accuracy
is expected as when we insert more calls into the malware
traces, TPM no longer matches the modified samples as more
paths are added into semantically-relevant set affecting its
frequency distribution. This is expected as insertion of rarely
invoked system-calls does not affect TPM as it is akin to
adding some transition to almost isolated nodes and such paths
are unlikely to be included in semantically-relevant set unless
a large number of injection takes place. With RISC, our model
performs better when compared to FISC. By inserting benign
call sequences, we observe an increase in false detection rate of
our model. The maximum decrease of 6.9% and 13.6% in the
detection accuracy is observed for RISC and FISC experiments
respectively. The feasibility of inserting calls of RISC set is
more than the FISC as the latter set of calls can affect the
prime objective of malware. Therefore, our method shall work
without much loss in detection accuracy.
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Fig. 5: True Positives and False Positives with RISC and FISC.
The other important concern of call-injection in our ap-
proach is to modify the Sstart and Send . For this, we closely
inspect the variation in ALBF value of paths after adding
two irrelevant calls, i.e., S′start and S
′
end at initial and last
position of malware trace. By doing so, we observed that
the semantically-relevant set contains same paths with two
additional links, i.e., S′start → Sstart and Send → S
′
end showing
single outgoing transition. The ALBF metric (Equation 4) is
sensitive to path-length as well as the branching factor. If two
additional links are added that were not there in the previous
OSCG, then only path-length is affected and increased by 2.
The branching factor remains same as the link-count is 1 for
both the links. A negligible fall in ALBF is observed due
to increase in the path-length. This fall in the majority of
cases does not change the bins of those modified paths hence
it will not affect our approach. Now, if a long sequence of
unrelated calls is added (pre/post) to just increase the path-
length then in very few cases it will affect the ALBF as we
have restricted the path-lengths (from 10 to 31). To evade the
approach, malware authors have to append and prepend a long
sequence of unrelated calls with higher outgoing transitions,
which modify the bins of all the paths in such a way that
increases the false alarm rate.
E. Comparison with existing approaches
In the previous section, we have shown that our approach
has resulted into better detection accuracy. However, we need
to compare with other approaches to asses the quality of our
results. Here, we present a comparative evaluation with current
state-of-art dynamic malware detection techniques. Moreover,
we analyze the impact of call-injection attack on our approach
to one proposed by Park et al. [11].
Compared to previous work, our proposed approach shows
improved malware detection rates. Figure 6 shows the TPR
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Fig. 6: Comparison with existing malware detection approaches.
and FPR of every approach. From this figure, our proposed
approach is shown to outperform other methods, with the
highest true positives and the lowest false positives. The better
performance of our approach is due to semantically-relevant
paths, which represent the program semantics that cover the
most relevant behavior of malware and benign programs.
Park et al. [11] proposed a graph clustering method [48]
for deriving the common behavior of malware samples. The
authors performed an abstraction from system-call traces and
used kernel objects [49] to represent malware behavior. Fur-
ther, they applied graph matching and determined a threshold
to asses the detection rate of their approach. Moreover, the
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authors have built a kernel object behavior graph (KOBG)
to exploit the dependency between the kernel objects. The
kernel objects and their dependencies information is extracted
from the system-call traces acquired using Ether framework.
To evaluate Park’s approach on our samples, we adapted
their approach as mentioned in [11]. We constructed KOBG
in similar fashion and built a weighted common behavior
graph (WCBG) using McGregor algorithm. To implement the
algorithm, we made use of graph C++ Library provided by
the Boost Software [50].
Figure 7 contrasts the performance decay of our proposed
with the one in [11] for call-injection rate ranging from 0%
to 100%. It is quite clear that our approach outperforms
the approach in [11]. In our approach, the maximum fall
observed is ∼13% while in [11] the observed maximum fall
is ∼23%. The detection accuracy of Park’s approach with 0%
injection rate is observed as 92.45%. The false alarm rates of
their approach are 8.2 (FNR) and 6.9 (FPR). The approach
by Park et al. [11] is based on exact-pattern matching as
a result of which the call-injection attack and false alarm
rates result into higher performance deterioration. However,
our approach is not based on exact pattern matching, but
abstracts semantically-relevant paths as bins of branching
factor. Therefore, it is less vulnerable to call-injection attack.
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VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we introduced the concept of specifying
program semantics in order to discriminate the malicious
from non-malicious binaries. To address this, we abstracted
the system-calls to a higher level and created sets containing
semantically-relevant paths. These semantically-relevant paths
cumulatively represent the program semantics since each path
sequence exhibits a specific functionality of the program. In
this section, we discuss the merits and demerits of proposed
approach. For any malware detection approach, it has to
address the issues such as generality, resiliency, stealthiness
and associated overhead.
A. Generality
Generality determines the ability of detection model to scale
uniformity with 1) comprehensive set of malware samples, and
2) known (training) and unknown (test) malware instances.
We used two different datasets that include a wide spectrum
of malware samples. The overall detection accuracy with both
the datasets Dold and Dnew are observed as 96% and 94.85%
respectively. Both the figures are nearly the same with a
marginal difference of 1.15% occurred due to the presence
of malware samples in Dnew, which do not manifest their
malicious behavior during runtime. These samples are termed
as detection-aware malware. The detection-aware malware
senses the presence of instrumented virtual environment. In the
proposed approach, to create the virtual environment, we used
Ether. Ether can be detected as the BIOS data strings for Ether
make use of emulated variant from Bochs virtual machine.
Moreover, the Ethernet card that is emulated by underlying
Xen system can be analyzed easily. The detection-aware
malware exploits these variations and ensures that it cannot
be analyzed. As a result, it generates partial log or no log
during runtime. Our datasets do not include the samples with
no logs. Therefore, the only concern is the generated partial
logs that result into misclassification. Although, in our case
the false alarm rates were significantly low as compared to
other existing approaches [6], [20], [30], [40]. This particular
limitation is common to the majority of dynamic malware
detection approaches. In future, we can substitute Ether with
more resilient framework or we may augment more than
one framework (emulated, virtualized, and instrumented) to
retrieve complete logs of detection-aware malware.
The other factor that assures the generality is the per-
formance of our detection model with known and unknown
malware samples. We observed the uniformity in our train-
ing (95.42%) and testing (93.8%) results. In our case, the
difference in training and testing results is only 1.6% which is
negligible. Hence, our model achieves the generality and thus
capable of detecting a wide range of malware instances.
B. Resiliency
Resiliency refers to the robustness of the proposed approach
in the presence of possible evasion embedded into malware
files. As our proposed model relies on system-call traces, one
possible evasion technique to thwart our model is system-call
injection attack. Using this attack, malware authors modify
the system-call sequences of malware binaries at run time.
For incorporating this, the malware authors either make mod-
ifications into the malware program or create new binaries
through the injection of system-calls. We ran two different
experiments to evaluate the robustness of our approach against
behavior obfuscation. The experimental results indicate that
the detection accuracy remain invariant up to 30% of call
injection rate. Beyond this, we observed a fall in detection
accuracy that stabilizes above an injection rate of 70%. The
system-call sequences of our malware dataset contain on an
average more than 105 calls. Inserting even 10K, 20K and
30K independent calls into malware traces does not affect
the proposed mechanism. Furthermore, our dataset consists of
packed, polymorphic and metamorphic samples which indicate
that the proposed approach can complement existing static
malware detection methods.
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C. Stealthiness
Stealthiness refers to the detection capability by which
our approach operates with high detection accuracy without
disclosing discriminating patterns to malware attackers. The
discriminating component of our approach is neither a se-
quence of system-calls nor a feature space linearly derived
from these sequences. The discriminating component of our
method is composed of the ranges of ALBF values. As these
values are accumulated in bin, our feature space is non-linearly
related to the sequence of calls. Multiple semantically-relevant
paths imply different subsequence of calls being used in the
construction of feature space. Modification in one path shall
not impact performance of the proposed model. Only large
modifications in transitions of all semantically-relevant paths
will affect our model. The modification is complex as the
attacker needs to identify all semantically-relevant paths and
modifying the path sequences in a way that it substantially
modifies ALBF bins. Hence, our proposed approach provides
stealthiness and is resilient against present and future mali-
cious threats.
D. System Overhead
In conjunction to its detection accuracy and resiliency
against call-injection attacks, we also discuss the associated
overheads of the proposed approach. Table V shows the best,
average and worst time per sample during the main steps of
our approach. The total time shown in the Table V does not
include monitoring time as it is common to all behavior-based
approaches. Each step is discussed as follows.
TABLE V: Best, Average and Worst Processing time of each
sample
Main Steps Best Average Worst
Time (in sec.) Time (in sec.) Time (in sec.)
System-Call Monitoring – – 600
OSCG Construction 0.001 0.02 1.2
Candidate-Paths Computation 0.005 3355.86 35109.9
Semantically-relevant Paths
Extraction
0.07 0.18 0.67
Training Time 1.54 1.54 1.54
Total Time 1.616 3357.6 35113.31
-Monitoring Time
1) System-call Monitoring: Execution tracing of benign and
malware binaries in our approach depends on Ether. Therefore,
the overheads associated with Ether are inherited into our
approach. We fixed the time-out of 10 minutes (600 seconds).
Therefore, we observe this overhead of collecting system-
call traces. Monitoring executables from Ether is a time-
consuming task. Ether uses exceptions whenever a running
application makes a system-call to access system services.
These exceptions result into significant performance over-
head. To reduce this overhead, we can use a faster analysis
framework. The proposed approach is not specific to a given
monitoring environment and can be generalized by applying
the same methodology with other operating systems as well
as virtual/sandboxing environments. To investigate this, we
conducted a small experiment using 20 malware samples of
Dnew dataset. We collected execution traces of these samples
from Cuckoo sandbox with 10 minutes of timeout. To extract
the run-time traces of executables, we submit the sample
via submit.py. The inline “Cuckoo Agent” (agent.py)
receives the executable and analyzes it. After the analysis
is over, a behavior report is generated which includes logs
containing various parameters such as API, system-calls, static
attributes, DLL invoked, PE header, and processes created
during runtime. We used the generated behavior report and
extracted the system-calls that are invoked. We then created
the feature space for these samples in a similar fashion as men-
tioned earlier and closely observed the variation in frequency
distribution of Ether generated traces with Cuckoo generated
traces. We found out that there is a negligible variance in the
frequency distribution in both the cases.
2) OSCG Construction: In this phase, we extract the
system-call sequences from the acquired traces and then build
the TPM using the transitions of system-calls. The processing
time for TPM construction is negligible (average: 0.02 sec.
and worst: 1.2 sec.) as it depends on the trace length. For
samples with larger trace-length, OSCG is constructed in few
seconds and for average trace length, it is constructed in few
milliseconds. We can say that this phase does not lead to higher
processing time.
3) Candidate-path Computation: In our approach, we de-
termined the paths between Sstart to Send . In this quest, we
observed that the time complexity for determining all paths is
very high. We have shown that our OSCGs are sparse in nature
as the average link-count of our samples is less than the total
number of nodes. Therefore, our approach does not result into
exponential time complexity. However, the processing time
for computing all-paths is significantly high that it affects
the applicability of our approach in real-time situations. To
reduce this processing, we approximated all-path computation
and determined the candidate paths by restricting the path-
length. The average processing time for computing candidate-
paths is ∼3355 seconds and the worst processing time is
∼35109 seconds. Though, this approximation improves the
processing time of our approach yet when compared to other
existing approaches it is slightly high. In order to minimize
the time complexity of this phase, we can use more efficient
path-computation algorithm. The authors in [34], proposed
a survey of various parallel graph algorithms using systolic
arrays, associative processors, array processors, and multiple
CPU computers. General-Purpose Computing on Graphics
Processing Units (GPGPU) provides a powerful platform to
implement the data-intensive algorithm. Kaczmarski et al. [51]
proposed an approach for accelerating the Breadth First
Search (BFS) algorithm with CUDA implementation on GPU.
The authors have shown the significant improvement over
CPU-based implementation of BFS. The results we present
show great promise in using semantically-relevant paths to
classify malware, the computational complexity would be
prohibitive in a real-time setting. In future, we will also create
the parallel version of our path-computation algorithm and
reduce the incurred overhead.
4) Training Time: Training time includes the time taken to
train our feature vector. This is measured with respect to
entire feature vector. It is one-time cost of the order ∼1.54
seconds. It is not measured per sample. Although, to keep our
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system up-to-date, we need to train our model with the newer
samples within fixed time interval (monthly or quarterly).
VII. RELATED WORK
Our proposed approach addresses the problem of malware
detection. The desirable property of any malware detector
is that it must be capable of detecting zero-day and unseen
malicious attacks. Modern malware is analysis-aware, i.e., it
tries to evade the existing detection mechanisms whether static
or dynamic. As discussed earlier, we prefer execution-based
dynamic approach over static to overcome the limitations of
the latter. In this section, we review dynamic approaches of
malware detection published in the literature that represent the
extracted dynamic attributes in one of the following forms: 1)
n-grams, 2) feature-statistics and 3) graphs.
A. n-gram based Approaches
The n-gram based representation has been deployed in many
dynamic malware detection approaches [45], [52], [53]. n-
gram is a contiguous sequence of n features extracted in a
sliding window (moves one feature at a time) manner from
program traces. The authors in [45], [52] have presented an ap-
proach that identifies the malicious behavior using Application
Programming Interface (APIs) and system-calls respectively.
They have applied a fingerprinting approach matching the n-
gram features prominently present in malware but absent in
benign applications. Yongzheng et al. [53] have presented
a visualization approach using DotPlots to cluster similar
malware instances. For this, authors have made use of byte
opcodes and constructed the n-gram features. They have also
applied hash-based content sampling to reduce their feature
space. The n-gram based representation methods suffer from
the drawback of dimensionality and depend on two parameters
n (consecutive number of features to be considered) and
L (total number of n-gram) [30].
B. Feature-statistics based Approaches
In literature, security researchers have utilized the statistics
of extracted features to identify malicious binaries. The statis-
tics include feature count, probability, data-value, entropy,
information-gain, temporal values, to name a few. Islam et
al. [20] have proposed an approach that uses static and
dynamic attributes to classify benign and malware samples.
They have applied four classifiers, Support Vector Machines,
Decision Trees, Random Forest, and Instance-based to carry
out their objective. A similar approach was proposed by
Ahmadi et al. [40]. The authors have used API calls to
construct their feature vector. Then, they applied two feature
selection methods (fisher score and CFSSUBSETEVAL) to
remove the redundant and irrelevant features. Authors in [54]
used temporal values of system object and visualized the
malware sample using treemaps and threaded graphs. Directly
applying feature-statistics of raw feature leads to high false
alarm rates as these statistics provide a low signal-to-noise
ratio.
C. Graph-based Approaches
The Graph-based representation is deployed to encode the
relative information of dynamic attributes. To detect malware
using graph-based modeling, a graph or subgraph with aggre-
gated feature attributes is formed. This modeling represents
the dependency structure of binaries in terms of control-flow,
data-flow, and information-flow. The proposed approach makes
use of graph-based representation as other two have few limita-
tions that restrict them in specifying actual malicious behavior.
Our proposed approach extracts the program semantics and
uses it to train our detection model. Existing approaches [8],
[9], [11], [30], [55]–[57] use graph-based representation to
capture malicious programs. The authors in [55], [56] have
presented a visualization approach to cluster the samples
showing malign behavior. Another clustering approach pro-
posed by Jacob et al. [9] which specifically identifies bot-
initiated Command & Control (C&C) communication. They
have constructed a behavior graph of system call traces. C&C
templates are created with known and unknown C&C commu-
nications. The authors claimed that these templates share sim-
ilarity in behavior graph and thus samples with homogeneous
C&C activities are grouped into the same clusters. A similar
behavior-based malware detection approach was proposed by
Shan et al. [6]. In their approach, authors have constructed
behavior templates containing OS-level information-flow. The
behavior templates represent the group of atomic behaviors.
An unknown sample with suspicious behavior is marked if its
behavior template is matched with one of the templates stored
in database.
Shun et al. [57] have developed a dependency structure ma-
trix (DSM) to show the task/module dependencies to detect the
module-based co-working malware. The approach proposed
by Anderson et al. [30] detects malware by utilizing Markov
chain based dependency graphs of program traces. They have
incorporated multiple kernel learning to construct a weighted
combination of combined feature set (opcodes, basic blocks
and system calls). Fredrikson et al. [8] have developed a tool
named as HOLMES. It works in two steps: 1) Extraction of
significant malicious behaviors and 2) Creation of a discrim-
inative specification of malware behavior. For this, a depen-
dency graph is constructed in which graph vertices (system-
calls) are connected by dependency in their arguments. They
have extracted a common synthesized malware behavior by
applying structural leap mining. A similar approach has been
proposed by authors in [11]. They have constructed a kernel
object behavior graph (KOBG) to derive the common behavior
of malware families. The authors have created a HOTPath
and applied an exact pattern matching approach. The majority
of these approaches make use of graph matching that is
ambiguous due to graph isomorphism. On the other hand, our
approach that is independent of any graph-matching and thus
more robust with system-call injection attacks as compared to
other existing approaches as shown by our experiments.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Malware detection is the first line of defense against mali-
cious threats. Modern malware is detection-aware therefore
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detecting all types of malware is a daunting task. In this
paper, we proposed a new mechanism for identifying current
malicious binaries which are resilient to static and dynamic
obfuscation techniques. To carry out this objective, we
captured the execution flow of malicious binaries in terms of
system-calls and transformed them into Ordered System-Call
Graph (OSCG). Then, we applied the concept of Asymptotic
Equipartition Property (AEP) inherited from information the-
ory. Using AEP, we produced a set of semantically-relevant
paths from each OSCG. These paths cumulatively describe
the average behavior of a binary. Our experimental results
demonstrate that semantically-relevant paths can be used to
infer the malicious behavior and to detect numerous new and
unseen malware samples. The proposed approach shows its
robustness against system-call injection attacks. In addition,
we also compared our method with existing solutions. We
observed that our approach was more efficient in terms of
malware detection rate. Our future work will focus on the
development of path computation algorithms to reduce the
overhead.
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